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Sometimes people, despite their best intentions to be hon-
est, choose to or are forced to lie. In the current experi-
ment, we focused on two types of lies: false denials of
factual information and using fabricated details to embel-
lish a story. Numerous motivations can precede the deci-
sion to engage in deceitful behavior. For instance, a certain
situation may make dishonesty appear to be the more al-
luring, feasible, or safe option. Such as, for example, the
case when people tell lies in order to avoid conflict or spare
the feelings of others (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer,
& Epstein, 1996). Whatever reason, it is understandable
that people may opt to falsely deny victimization (e.g., sexual
abuse) and guilt (e.g., sexual offending) or fabricate informa-
tion when placed in high-stakes situations such as those where
allegations of child sexual abuse (CSA) are made.
For victims in CSA cases, (false) denial can serve as a coping
tool since there may be various perceived advantages to lying
about event related information. Feeling guilty, ashamed or re-
sponsible (Magnusson, Ernberg, & Landström, 2017; Paine &
Hansen, 2002), CSA victims may falsely deny that the abuse
occurred or fabricate an alternative explanation (e.g., BMy geni-
tals hurt because I fell off my bike^) when they are questioned.
An important feature of false denial is that the person is fully
aware that they experienced a certain event, but deny it nonethe-
less. However, some victims may choose to be forthcoming and
tell the truth at first, but subsequently change their story because
of external factors (Otgaar, Howe, Smeets, & Wang, 2016).
An example of an external motivation to lie is when perpe-
trators coach (Lyon, Malloy, Quas, & Talwar, 2008), bribe, or
threaten victims to give dishonest statements (Paine &
Hansen, 2002). A person may also fabricate information by
giving false self-generated details or stories, but as is the case
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Abstract
The goal of the present experiment was to examine the effect of certain (deceptive) strategies (e.g., false denial) on memory.
Specifically, participants were shown a traumatic virtual reality (VR) video of an airplane crash. Following this, participants (N=
94) received questions concerning details from the VR scene in a baseline memory task. Then, participants could choose from 3
options how to cope in response to having experienced the VR scene: tell the truth, falsely deny, or fabricate. The majority opted
to tell the truth (n = 81). A subsample of truth tellers were instructed to falsely deny having seen certain details. One week later, all
participants received a source monitoring task in which they were asked (1) whether they remembered talking about these details
during an interview, and (2) whether they remembered seeing certain details during the VR experience the week before.
Participants had to tell the truth during this task. Participants who were instructed to falsely deny showed impaired memory
for presented details that had previously been discussed (i.e., denial-induced forgetting) and seen in the VR scene. Also, the
presentation of certain details in the baseline memory task seemed to inoculate participants who were instructed to falsely deny
from experiencing memory impairment. The current experiment suggests that false denials can have adverse ramifications for
memory for what is discussed and seen.
with false denial, there is also limited knowledge about the
impact of fabrication on memory. In cases where victims are
forced to lie (e.g., falsely deny, fabricate), the question that
arises is how such lies can have an impact on the memory for
an event (e.g., abuse) when telling the truth later on.
To date, research on the memory effects of false denial
has used stimuli such as videos (Otgaar, Howe, Memon, &
Wang, 2014; Otgaar, Romeo, Howe, & Ramakers, 2018)
and pictures (Otgaar et al., 2016). Since real-world gener-
alizability is limited when using stimuli such as videos or
pictures, in the current experiment participants experienced
a more ecologically valid stimulus (i.e., traumatic virtual
reality scene). The chief aim was to investigate memory
effects in persons who wish to tell the truth but are
instructed to use an alternative cognitive strategy that they
did not initially choose (i.e., truth tellers who were
instructed to false deny). As research on the effects of
fabrication on memory is also quite limited, we also
intended to examine the memory effect of this type of lie.
Coping with adverse experiences
Coping with adverse experiences serves to control the
meaning and emotional effects of unfavorable experiences
(Lazarus, 1991). When choosing how to cope with an ex-
perience, a process of appraisal of the level of threat (i.e.,
severity and controllability of the stressor; Blaxton &
Bergeman, 2017) posed is first undertaken. Ultimately, if
a person determines that their resources cannot sufficiently
satisfy the internal or external demands of a situation, he or
she may use either a cognitive or behavioral strategy in
order to cope (Lazarus, 1991). Denial is regarded as one
of those coping strategies. The general consensus is that
strategies such as self-blame (Daigneault, Hébert, &
Tourigny, 2006; Skinner, Edge, Altman, & Sherwood,
2003), avoidance and denial (Guerra, Pereda, Guilera,
Abad, 2016; Lazarus, 1991) are inefficient coping strate-
gies. For example, such strategies have been found to be
significant predictors in the development of posttraumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) in trauma survivors (Hooberman,
Rosenfeld, Rasmussen, & Keller, 2010).
Another strategy that can be used to cope with adverse
experiences is fabrication. In order to cope, people some-
times integrate fabricated details during the process of cog-
nitively restructuring their perception of an experienced
event (Mrazek & Mrazek, 1987). Cognitive restructuring
has been found to facilitate resilience in some victims,
albeit harmful in the long run. An example of this is when
victims reconstruct the motive of a person who has harmed
them to make it seem positive. The unabated act of altering
the perception of an experience can result in a disconnec-
tion from reality (Mrazek & Mrazek, 1987). In doing so, a
person can alter details (e.g., add or change details to di-
minish the impact of a traumatic experience) about an ex-
perienced or witnessed event. Although research is scarce
concerning the effects of fabrication on memory, there is
work on forced confabulation on memory. Forced confab-
ulation actually entails self-generating information (i.e.,
fabrication), and it has been found that forced confabula-
tion of details results in people recalling false memories
(i.e., commission errors). Ackil and Zaragoza (1998) com-
pared the levels of false memories that were generated in
young children (i.e., first, third and fourth graders) and
college students. All participants viewed a clip from a film
and were then asked five true-event and three false-event
questions about the film. Participants in the forced confab-
ulation condition were asked to answer all of the questions
and to guess even if they did not know. Participants in the
control group were required respond to all questions but
only if they were certain of the answers and were instructed
to not guess. One week later, all of the participants were
given a source-monitoring task. Despite knowing that they
had confabulated information, participants in all age
groups of the confabulation condition reported false mem-
ories. Similar results of forced confabulation resulting in
false memories were found in more recent studies (Ackil &
Zaragoza, 2011; Otgaar et al., 2014; Zaragoza, Payment,
Ackil, Drivdahl, & Beck, 2001). Although the work on
forced confabulation is related to the current experiment,
this work has not been couched in terms of the effects of
coping or deceptive strategies on memory. We were there-
fore interested in understanding how this type of deception
could affect memory.
Coping and memory
Denial has often been regarded as a strategy that might impede
the recollection of an event (Baumeister, Dale, & Sommer,
1998). In fact, a recent theoretical memory and deception
framework (MAD) postulates that different types of lies can
exert a different effect on memory (Otgaar & Baker, 2018).
Deception requires the use of more cognitive resources than
being honest (Suchotzki, Crombez, Smulders, Meijer, &
Verschuere, 2015; Vrij & Fisher, 2016). According to the
MAD framework, such false denials will lead to a lack of
rehearsal of the event and to forgetting of the lied-upon event.
In contrast, when a deceptive strategy such as fabrication is
employed, new details are constucted which might become
misremembered at a later moment.
Research on the extent to which different cognitive strate-
gies hinder memory processes varies depending on the partic-
ular deceptive strategy of focus. For example, Vieira and Lane
(2013) demonstrated that denial can impair memory. In their
study, participants were first asked to study a series of pictures
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(e.g., an apple). Next, they were shown items that included
both the old and new pictures, and they were instructed to tell
the truth, deny, or describe (fabricate) information.
Reassessment of participants’ memory 48 hours later showed
that in contrast to describing details that they did not see, the
denial of details that they had actually seen was associated
with less recall of studied items from the first session.
Recently, it has also been shown that (false) denials can
uniquely affect memory in that they impair memory for what
was discussed with an experimenter. This memory impair-
ment effect is known as denial-induced forgetting (DIF).
Otgaar et al. (2014) observed DIF in their study in which
participants (children and adults) first viewed a video of a theft
and were subsequently instructed to falsely deny information.
Specifically, in Session 1, participants in the false denial con-
dition were instructed to deny all of the information when they
were interviewed. The following day, participants received a
source-monitoring test and were instructed to respond truth-
fully. What was demonstrated was that participants in the false
denial condition exhibited memory impairment for details that
they discussed in the first interview. To date, DIF has been
replicated in various experiments using different stimuli (i.e.,
negative and neutral pictures; Otgaar et al., 2016), different
memory tasks (recall and recognition; Otgaar et al., 2018), and
when participants were instructed to feign memory loss for a
crime (Romeo, Otgaar, Smeets, Landström, & Jelicic, 2018).
One issue in previous experiments on the effect of de-
nying on memory is that participants were explicitly
instructed to falsely deny (e.g., Otgaar et al., 2014;
Otgaar et al., 2016; Otgaar et al., 2018; Vieira & Lane,
2013). Of course, in many cases, victims decide them-
selves whether they will use a certain strategy to cope with
an adverse experience. Hence, another important aim of the
current experiment was to examine the proportion of par-
ticipants who choose themselves to use a deceptive strate-
gy. In the current experiment, participants were shown a
negative virtual reality scene of an airplane crash that in-
cluded unpleasant details (e.g., dead bodies on the ground).
In order to assess their preferences, all participants were
initially allowed to choose a coping strategy from a list of
options (i.e., tell the truth, falsely deny, fabricate).
The present study will be the first to examine the memory
effect of using a coping strategy following exposure to a trau-
matic virtual reality (VR) experience. As said before, we were
interested in participants’ choices from among the options of
truth telling, false denial, or fabrication. We had no specific
predictions on how many participants would choose for dif-
ferent coping strategies. However, in case participants were
especially choosing to tell the truth, we made sure that in this
group, participants would be instructed to falsely deny.
Following theMAD framework, our main hypothesis was that
the denial-induced forgetting effect would be observed in par-
ticipants who chose to falsely deny.
Method
Participants
Using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), an
a priori power analysis with a power of 0.80 and an anticipated
medium effect size (f = 0.29) indicated a sample of 95 partic-
ipants was required. Ninety-five undergraduate students (79
female) from Maastricht University were tested. Their mean
age was 21.32 years (SD = 2.49; range: 18–35 years).
Compensation for both consisted of university credits or a
voucher worth €10.00. As a preintervention precaution, the
PCL-5 (PTSD checklist) was used to screen participants to
ensure that exposure to the experimental stimulus would not
compound any preexisting emotional and or psychological
problems. The Ethical Committee of the Faculty of
Psychology and Neuroscience of Maastricht University
granted ethical permission (Reference Number: ERCPN-
173_04_11_2016). This study was preregistered and details
about the parameters of the design, interview protocols and
data can be accessed on the Open Science Framework (OSF):
https://osf.io/fgw4s/
Materials
Categorizations of the true and false detail items that were
used in the memory tasks are included in 10.1037/t02622-
000 B.
Virtual reality (VR) scene The VR scene was designed in-
house by the Department Instrumentation Engineering of the
Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht
University. A HTC Vive headset was used and the simulated
scene operated on a Dell Precision 5810 computer. The VR
scene depicted an airplane crash with dead bodies scattered on
the ground. The scene was customized to include several spe-
cific visual and auditory details (e.g., sparking wires, a mother
crying). Participants’ movement within the VR space was
restricted to a 30-centimeter area in order to ensure that their
attention was focused on perceiving and processing the scene
rather than exploring the VR room (see Appendix Fig. 2). The
virtual reality (VR) analogue has been successfully used in
previous research as a traumatic stimulus (Dibbets &
Schulte-Ostermann, 2015).
Baseline memory task This baseline memory task was self-
administered and was a yes/no questionnaire that contained 12
questions (nine true items: e.g., BWas there a body on the
ground wearing a red shirt?^; three false items: e.g., BDid
the rain begin to fall?^).
Memory Task 1 After the baseline memory task another mem-
ory task was administered as a structured interview. It
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contained 12 yes/no questions (e.g., BDid you see a
helicopter?^) that also required some participants to restate
the question (i.e., false denial: BNo, I did not see a helicopter^)
or to restate the question and add an additional detail of their
choice (i.e., fabrication: BYes, I saw a helicopter and a fire
truck^). They were categorized as follows: five questions re-
lated to true presented details that were also included in all
memory tasks; three questions related to true details that were
also included in the source monitoring task and the memory
task that occurred after the source monitoring task; and four
questions related to false details that were included only in the
source monitoring task and the memory task that occurred
after the source monitoring task.
Source monitoring task The source monitoring task was a
structured interview that comprised 19 yes/no questions. The
questions were categorized as follows: Five questions related
to true presented details that were included in all memory
tasks; four questions related to true details that were also in-
cluded in the baseline task; three questions related to true
details that were also used in Memory Tasks 1 and 2; four
questions related to false details that were also included in
Memory Tasks 1 and 2; and three questions related to false
details that were also included in the baseline task and
Memory Task 2. Each item contained two parts: (a) an inter-
view related question (e.g., BDid the interviewer ask you if
there was a body on the ground wearing a red shirt?^) and (b)
an event related question (e.g., BDid you see a body on the
ground wearing a red shirt?^).
Memory Task 2 After the source monitoring task, a second
memory task was administered as a structured interview that
comprised of 19 yes/no questions. These questions were shuf-
fled restatements of the 19 questions from the source moni-
toring task and the format of the questions was the same as in
the first memory test (after the baseline memory task).
PCL-5 (PTSD checklist) The PCL-5 is a 20-item self-report
questionnaire that assesses for symptoms of PTSD based on
diagnostic criteria outlined in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-5;
American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Participant re-
sponses are measured on a 5-point Likert scale from 0 to 4
(e.g., 0 = not at all to 4 = extremely). Based on findings of the
scale’s psychometric properties from two studies, the PCL-5
exhibited strong internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .94),
test–retest reliability (r = .82), convergent validity (rs = .74
to .85), and discriminant validity (rs = .31 to .60) (Blevins,
Weathers, Davis, Witte, & Domino, 2015). The PCL-5 can be
scored in different ways, for example as a total sum, that is, a
cumulative score of 33 (out of a total possible score of 80) and
above is considered to be indicative of PTSD symptomology
(Weathers, Litz, Keane, Palmieri, Marx, & Schnurr, 2013).
Alternatively, and as was adopted for this study, scoring can
be done via symptom clusters. The 20 questions comprising
the PCL-5 are categorized according to symptom clusters as
they are outlined in the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric
Association, 2013). The questions are represented as follows:
1–5 (Cluster B), 6 and 7 (Cluster C), 8–14 (Cluster E), and 15–
20 (Cluster D). Criteria for PTSD symptoms are only consid-
ered to bemet if a participant respondsmoderately or higher to
one ormore questions in Cluster B and Cluster C and to two or
more questions in Cluster B and Cluster E (Weathers et al.,
2013).1 Persons who met the criteria for PTSD were excluded
from participating in the study.
Additional questionnaires One questionnaire was adminis-
tered at the end of the first session, and it assessed participants’
perceptions of the realism of the VR scene. The questionnaire
consisted of seven items (e.g., BDid you think the VR clip was
traumatic?^). The second questionnaire contained nine items,
eight of which were extracted from the Impact of Event Scale–
Revised (IES-R; e.g., BDid you have trouble staying
asleep?^). The ninth question was a restatement of the sixth
item from the first questionnaire (i.e., BDid you think the VR
clip was traumatic?^). Both questionnaires were scored on a
5-point Likert scale (i.e., 0 = not at all to 4 = extremely). These
results will not be presented at length in this paper.
Design and procedure
A between-subjects design was used, and some participants
were assigned to different conditions based on their own
choices (i.e., truth telling, n = 41). Other participants were
assigned to conditions randomly a priori to their participation
(i.e., directed false denial, n = 40; false denial, n = 8; fabrica-
tion, n = 5). Since most participants chose to tell the truth,
there was an insufficient number of participants in the false
denial and fabrication conditions; therefore, only the data from
the truth-telling and the directed false denial conditions were
used in the final analyses. A depiction of the study’s procedure
can be found in Fig. 1.
In Session 1, participants were shown a scene of a plane
crash site in a virtual reality environment for 2 minutes. Next,
participants were guided to a separate interview room to com-
plete the baseline memory task, followed by a spot-the-
difference distractor task for which participants were allotted
1 minute to identify the discrepancies between two seemingly
identical pictures. This was done in order to prevent the ex-
tensive rehearsal of information from the VR scene.
Following this, participants were given a script that contained
definitions of the coping strategies of interest for this study
(i.e., truth telling, false denial, and fabrication). They were
1 See http://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/assessment/adult-sr/ptsd-checklist.
asp
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then told that a strategy was chosen for them through random
selection by a computer before the session began, but the
interviewer wanted to know what they would choose if given
the choice. Through a process of predetermined selection
using an Excel table of randomly ordered numbers (i.e., 1 =
tell the truth; 2 = falsely deny), the experimenter determined
which participants from the truth-telling condition would be
forced to falsely deny. A subsample of participants who chose
truth telling and all of the participants who chose false denial
and fabrication were (falsely) told that their choice was the
same as the computerized choice. A subsample of truth tellers
were told that Bfalse denial^was selected for them. During the
first memory test (after the baseline memory task), truth tellers
were instructed to respond honestly to all of the questions.
False deniers and directed false deniers were instructed to
deny in response to all of the questions (e.g., BNo, I did not
see a helicopter^); and the fabricators were instructed to re-
spond honestly and add an extra detail (e.g., BYes, I saw a
helicopter and an ambulance^). Session 2 was conducted 1
week later, and a source monitoring task was administered
first. Each source monitoring item had two parts. Part A was
related to the interview in Session 1 (e.g., BDid the interviewer
ask you if you saw a car?^) and Part Bwas related to what they
saw in the VR scene (e.g., BDid you see a car?^). For the last
part of Session 2, a second memory test was administered.
Finally, participants were asked about their reasons for choos-
ing their strategy in Session 1 (i.e., BWhat made you choose
that strategy in response to seeing the VR scene?^).
Interrater reliability
In order to understand why participants chose a specific strat-
egy, a data-driven thematic analysis was conducted on re-
sponses that were given by participants after Session 2 was
concluded (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The first author extracted
general themes from the exploratory data and created descrip-
tive codes; this process involved several stages of refinement
until main themes were constructed. In a first round, 21 (20%
of the combined total of participants from the truth-telling and
directed false denial conditions) randomly selected responses
were independently rated by the first author and a second rater.
Insufficient interrater agreement resulted in meetings to dis-
cuss descriptive issues and resolve disagreements. A second
round of independent ratings were conducted, which ultimate-
ly established the final six themes that were used to rate all of
the participants in the truth-telling and directed false denial
conditions. Individual kappa values were calculated for each
of the six themes that were used to rate participants in the
truth-telling and directed false denial conditions (i.e., mini-
mum K = 0.37, p = 06; maximum K = 0.86, p < .01). An
average kappa value from the six themes showed that there
was a substantial level of interrater reliability, K = 0.68, p =
.01. All of the themes and definitions can be found in
Appendix Table 3.
Results
One participant did not attend the second session and was
therefore excluded from all analyses, leaving a final sample
of 94 participants.
Baseline memory task
Statistical analyses were conducted between the baseline
scores for the truth-telling and directed false denial conditions.
A Welch’s independent-samples t test showed that the truth-
telling (M = 7.71, SD = 1.06) and directed false denial (M =
7.98, SD = 0.86) conditions did not statistically differ in their
response accuracy for true details, t(76.67) = −1.25, p = .21, d
= 0.28, 95% CI [−0.17, 0.73]. For false details, the difference
was statistically significant, t(51.40) = −2.78, p = 0.01, d =
0.63, 95% CI [0.17, 1.09] (i.e., truth telling: M = 2.78, SD =
0.42; directed false denial: M = 2.98, SD = 0.16).
Fig. 1. Depiction of the study’s procedure
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Source monitoring task
To examine whether a denial-induced forgetting effect was
detected, we assessed the memory performance concerning
the interview-related questions of the source monitoring task.
Memory for the interview AWelch’s independent-samples t
test revealed a statistically significant effect, t(79) = 3.95, p
< .001, d = 0.88, 95% CI [0.41, 1.35] for true details that
were discussed during the first memory task. Specifically,
participants in the directed false denial condition had
poorer memory (M = 1.55, SD = .93) than truth tellers (M
= 2.29, SD = .75). For false details, the difference between
the directed false denial (M = 1.73, SD = 1.22) and truth
telling (M = 2.66, SD = 1.02) condition was also statisti-
cally significant, t(79) = 3.74, p < .001, d = 0.83, 95% CI
[0.37, 1.29].
Memory for the VR scene We found a statistically significant
difference between the two groups for true details that partic-
ipants reported to have seen in the VR clip, t(79) = 2.06, p =
.04, d = 0.45, 95% CI [0, 0.90]). These details were measured
in the first memory task but not measured in the baseline
questionnaire. Similar to the discussed true details, memory
accuracy was lower in the directed false denial group (M =
1.33, SD = 0.76) than in the truth-telling group (M = 1.66, SD
= 0.69). However, because participants in the directed false
denial group were instructed to deny in response to all of the
questions in the first memory test, it could not be established
whether they did or did not encode those details during expo-
sure to the VR scene. Despite this caveat, it is worth noting
that we did not find evidence of analogous memory impair-
ment for true items that were measured in both the baseline
questionnaire and the first memory task and true items that
were measured in the baseline questionnaire only.
Specifically, there was no significant difference between the
groups for either of the latter categories, t(79) = 0.08, p = .94, d
= 0.01, 95% CI [−0.43, 0.45]; t(79) = −1.12, p = .26, d = 0.25,
95%CI [−0.20, 0.70]). Thus, this difference that was observed
between the truth-telling and directed false denial conditions
in the first memory task may reflect genuine memory impair-
ment, rather than an artifact.
Exploratory analyses
True items in the baseline and first memory test Interestingly,
we found that no denial-induced forgetting was shown for true
items that were presented in the baseline questionnaire first.
Specifically, when the directed false denial group (M = 4.75,
SD = 0.93) was instructed to deny these true details during the
interview in the first memory test, there was not a statistically
significant difference in their level of memory accuracy in the
interview in the second session when compared to truth tellers
(M = 4.88, SD = 0.40) when they were interviewed in the
second session, t(79) = 0.80, p = .43, d = 0.18).
Virtual reality experience At the end of session one, we
assessed participants’ perceptions of the VR scene in terms
of realism and traumatic feelings. Five questions were related
to perceptions of realism (e.g., BWas the VR world
believable?^). To measure realism, each of the five questions
was rated on a 5-point Likert scale (i.e., 0 = not at all to 4 =
extremely), and then an average score was calculated. One
question was related to perceptions of evoked feelings of trau-
ma (e.g., BDid you think the VR clip was traumatic?^), and
this was also rated using the 5-point Likert scale. The final
question assessed participants’ history of experiencing a VR
environment (e.g., BHave you ever been in a virtual reality
environment before?^). Overall, participants perceived the
VR scene as moderately realistic (M = 2.20, SD = 0.59) and
moderately traumatic (M = 1.73, SD = 1.20). Of the total
sample, 47 participants reported that they previously experi-
enced a VR environment.
Qualitative analyses Table 1 shows that the most commonly
reported theme by the truth-telling group was alternative
disadvantages (e.g., BTruth telling seemed the most fitting
strategy of the three^). Participants in the directed false denial
condition also reported alternative disadvantages most fre-
quently. The largest difference between the conditions was
found in the psychological outcomes theme (e.g., BTruth tell-
ing is the best way to deal with a traumatic experience^). See
Appendix Table 2 for themes and definitions.
Discussion
The primary aim of this experiment was to determine whether
the use of different types of coping strategies would affect
Table 1 Themes, frequencies, and percentages for participants in the
truth-telling and directed false denial conditions
Truth tellers Directed false deniers
Themes n % n %
Personal and societal factors 9 21.9 9 22.5
Beneficiary factors 10 24.4 10 25
Alternative disadvantages 12 29.3 11 27.5
Rationale 5 12.2 5 12.5
Psychological outcomes 5 12.2 9 22.5
Miscellaneous 10 24.4 8 20
Note. Some participants were assigned ratings for more than one theme.
Eighty participants were scored on one or two themes. Only one partic-
ipant was scored on three themes
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memory accuracy. Our most notable finding was that denial
undermined memory for what was discussed and what was
seen by participants. We will now elaborate on the relevance
of this finding for theory and practice.
Although participants were afforded the opportunity to
choose among three possibilities on how they wanted to
cope with the experience of viewing a traumatic virtual
reality scene, most participants (n = 81) chose to tell the
truth. We attributed the preference for truth telling to the
following. Participants adopted the role of witnesses and
not victims. This lack of self-relevance to the event might
make people less willing to use a coping strategy. To ad-
dress this issue, future research could use a stimulus that is
not only realistic but is also one in which the event is self-
relevant to the participants (e.g., a VR scene in which par-
ticipants are attacked). This resulted in two final groups
(i.e., truth telling and directed false denial). When looking
at the difference in memory performance between these
groups, a denial-induced forgetting effect was observed.
Specifically, memory for both true and false details that
were discussed in the interview in the first session was
impaired when participants were re-interviewed one week
later. These findings suggest that when people explicitly
choose to give honest accounts but then are forced to lie
by an external force, their memory for what was discussed
can be adversely affected. Our findings are consistent with
results from previous studies that examined the effects of
false denial on memory (Otgaar et al., 2014; Otgaar et al.,
2016; Otgaar et al., 2018; Romeo et al., 2018; Vieira &
Lane, 2013).
The current results are line with the MAD framework
(Otgaar & Baker, 2018). According to this framework,
when people falsely deny, participants are less likely to
rehearse the information. Therefore, when people falsely
deny, information concerning what is discussed is not
processed and stored optimally, resulting in a memory
undermining effect. In contrast to previous work on
denial-induced forgetting, we focused on which specific
details were less likely to be reported and found that false
denial did not impair memory for the category of details
that were included in both the baseline and first memory
task. That is, denial-induced forgetting was only evident
for information that was presented for the first time in the
first memory task when the directive to deny was given.
This implies that false denials only have a specific effect
on details when they are discussed at the same moment one
is forced to lie. It may be argued that the observed DIF was
the result of a lack of processing due to the manner in
which the questions were administered and not due to the
effortful act of denial. This issue was addressed in previous
work by Otgaar et al. (2016). The authors examined wheth-
er this explanation of a lack of processing might underlie
DIF. They reasoned that if participants did not truly
process information in the first session, then memory
would also be impaired for details that were only presented
in the second session. The idea was that if information for
the interview was not processed optimally, then partici-
pants would not remember which details were mentioned
in the first session and thus deny newly mentioned details
in the second session. However, their results showed that
false denial rates were actually statistically higher for de-
tails that were mentioned during Sessions 1 and 2 (memory
was worse) than for newly mentioned details during
Session 2. This would be comparable to the finding in
the current study that there was not a statistically signifi-
cant difference for memory in the source monitoring task
between the false denial and truth telling groups for true
details that were only presented in the baseline task and not
Memory Test 1. In fact, this is what we found, that is, p =
.55; false denial group M = 2.93; truth-telling group (M =
2.78). Since denial-induced forgetting was not exhibited
for these new true details (baseline only), this suggests that
during the first memory test, these participants did engage
in effortful denial. It is also important to note that prior to
the administration of Memory Test 1, participants read a
definition list that described the type of behaviour that was
reflective of each strategy. This was done to ensure that
participants had an idea what a denial entailed. Based on
the data that we just presented, we think it is unlikely that
participants simply adopted a strategy during the denial.
Our results also revealed some other prominent effects. We
found that memory for true details that were actually seen
during the virtual reality scene was adversely affected in the
(directed) false denial group, although the effect size was rath-
er small (d = 0.45). This suggests that false denials might not
only impair memory for what discussed, but might also neg-
atively impact memory for the experienced event.
Previous studies on the denial-induced forgetting did
not find false denials to adversely affect memory for the
stimuli. One reason for why this occurred in the current
experiment could be related to the stimuli that were used.
Compared with previous studies using pictures (i.e.,
Otgaar et al., 2016) or videos (i.e., Otgaar et al., 2014;
Otgaar et al., 2018), the virtual reality plane crash scene
contained highly rich and vivid visual and auditory details.
Participants perceived the VR scene to be moderately real-
istic and traumatic, so perhaps the unpleasant nature of
some of the detai ls (e.g. , body parts) motivated
participants—when falsely denying—to try to not think
of what they had seen. The consequence of this is that it
might have resulted in the memory undermining effects of
false denials. The possibility that this forgetting effect is a
false-positive result also cannot be ruled out. Furthermore,
to examine the robustness of this memory effect, future
research could include a truth-telling control group that
only has to tell the truth during the final memory tasks.
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Such a group would not have an extra opportunity to re-
hearse information, which is the case in the present exper-
iment. At present, similar to the explanation given for the
memory undermining effects of feigned amnesia, we sug-
gest that a lack of rehearsal may have caused the impaired
memory effect for the VR event (Christianson & Bylin,
1999; McWilliams; Goodman, Lyons, Newton, & Avila-
Mora, 2014; Sun, Punjabi, Greenberg, & Seamon, 2009;
Van Oorsouw & Merckelbach, 2004, 2006). More specifi-
cally, the root of the adverse effect simulated amnesia on
memory has been linked to the obstruction of the rehearsal
process. Given that these results are novel in research on
false denials, future effort to replicate this finding is rec-
ommended. Research along this line should continue to
examine the advantages of testing participants by using
more realistic stimuli such as virtual reality. Virtual reality
provides the advantage of being able to recreate real-life
emotionally intense situations that would otherwise be im-
possible to create (e.g., a plane crash site; Romano, 2005;
Visch, Valentijn, Tan, & Molenaar, 2010). Virtual reality
also facilitates the complex customization of details in such
a way that multiple sensory perceptions and emotions can
be tapped into (Waldrop, 2017).
Of note, memory impairment for the VR experience only
occurred for true details that were presented to participants in
the first memory task. That is, there was no memory impair-
ment for true details that were included in the baseline mem-
ory task first and then again in the first memory task, or for
true details that were only included in the baseline memory
task. This suggests that, for true details that were mentioned in
the baselinememory task, this baseline taskmight have served
a protective role and inoculated participants in the (directed)
false-denial group, thereby preserving their memory. Again,
this is in line with the argument that rehearsal or a lack thereof
can cause memory impairment in people who simulate amne-
sia (Christianson &Bylin, 1999; McWilliams et al., 2014; Sun
et al., 2009; Van Oorsouw & Merckelbach, 2004, 2006). So,
the baseline memory task facilitated the rehearsal and subse-
quent encoding of some of the details that were experienced.
To have a rough idea of the reasons participants used to
justify their choice of strategy, we also collected qualitative
data. The themes that emerged differed across the final groups
that were used in our analyses and the excluded false denial
and fabrication conditions. In terms of our truth-telling (n =
12) and directed false denial groups (n = 11), alternative
disadvantages was the most frequently reported theme.
Specifically, participants determined that false denial and fab-
rication were less advantageous means of coping. For exam-
ple, the latter strategies were perceived to be Btoo difficult^ or
Bmade remembering harder.^ We also found that the largest
difference between the truth-telling and directed false denial
groups lied in the psychological outcomes theme. It seems that
being forced to lie caused participants in the directed false
denial group to be more aware of the adverse psychological
impact of being dishonest about what they observed in the VR
scene.
To conclude, this experiment continues along a line of
studies that examine the effects of false denial on memory
and, more in general, the effects of lying on memory. In order
to enhance ecological validity, instead of viewing simple pic-
tures or a video, participants experienced a traumatic VR
event containing highly vivid and rich details. To gain some
understanding of how memory could be affected, some par-
ticipants in the experiment who chose to tell the truth were
directed to falsely deny. Consistent with previous results, we
observed a denial-induced forgetting effect. Denials not only
impaired memory for what was discussed, it also negatively
affected memory for the experienced event. This implies that
lying might even have a more general and damaging role on
memory than what has previously been assumed.
Appendix 1
Fig. 2. Pictorial Examples from the Virtual Reality Plane Crash Scene
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Appendix 2
Appendix 3
Table 2 Tasks and question categories
Task Category
Baseline memory task 5 true (1)
4 true (2)
3 false (1)










Note. These are the categorizations for the number of true and false items
that were presented in each task. The bracketed numbers distinguish
between different sets of true and false items. For example, there were
three distinct sets of true items, that is, (1), (2), and (3). There were two
distinct sets of false items, that is, (1) and (2). Note that some sets of items
are exclusive to some tasks, and others are repeated
Table 3
Themes and definitions for the truth telling and directed false denial conditions
Theme Definition
Personal and societal factors The participant based their choice on their personal value system, past behavior, expectations of others,
or societal morals
Beneficiary factors The participant based their choice on who would stand to benefit from the choice
(i.e., himself or herself or others)
Alternative disadvantages The participant based their choice on the perceived disadvantages of the alternative
choices (i.e., false denial and fabrication
Rationale The participant based their choice on rationale and sound reasoning; what seemed to be most sensible
Psychological outcomes The participant based their choice on the perceived psychological benefits
Miscellaneous The participant based their choice on a factor that was not captured in the preceding five themes
Themes and definitions for the false denial1,2,3,4,5 and fabrication1,3,4,6 conditions
Theme Definition
1Confidence in memory The participant based their choice on the fact that they were not confident in the memory for the VR scene
2External impact The participant based their choice on the negative ramifications that it could have on others
3Psychological outcomes The participant based their choice on the perceived psychological benefits
4Personal habits The participant based their choice on what was in keeping with their characters; what they would most
likely do if they were actually in such a situation
5Miscellaneous The participant based their choice on a factor that was not captured in the preceding four themes
6Personal and societal factors The participant based their choice on their personal value system, past behavior, expectations of others,
or societal morals
Note. The subscripts indicate which themes are relevant for the false denial and fabrication conditions
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